

Message Text

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF BILATERAL MEETING
MAY 21 BETWEEN UK DEP REPS AND POLSIH DEP REPS

FOLLOWING IS MEMO OF BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN UK
DEP REPS GOODALL AND FACER AND POLICH DEP REPS
JEDYNAK AND WIECZOREK WHICH WAS CIRCULATED
BY UK DEP REPS AT MAY 24 AHG MEETING.
BEGIN TEXT.

1. MM. JADYNAK AND WIECZOREK INVITED MR. GOODALL AND FACER
TO LUNCHON 21 MAY. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL - NOT TO SAY
CONVIVIAL - AND RELAXED. IT WAS PUNCTUATED BY M. JEDYNAK'S
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SMOKING ROOM STORIES.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH MR FACER, M. WIECZOREK WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THAT THE EASTERN INSISTENCE ON ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REDUCING FROM THE OUTSET SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A PRECONDITION OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE EASTERN ATTITUDE HAD NOT HARDENED DURING THE RECESS, THOUGH THEY FELT THAT THE WESTERN ATTITUDE HAD. THE POINT THEY WISHED TO MAKE WAS THAT IT WAS INHERENT IN THE MULTILATERAL NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ALL SHOULD TAKE PART IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET.

3. M. JEDYNAK MADE THE SAME POINTS IN PARALLEL TO MR GOODALL, AND ASKED WHY THE WESTERN POSITION HAD HARDENED SINCE THE RECESS. MR GOODALL SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO HARDENING OF THE WESTERN POSITION: ON THE CONTRARY, WE HAD THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS THE EASTERN POSITION WHICH HAD HARDENED. M. JEDYNAK EXPRESSED INCREDULITY AND SAID THAT, IN THAT CASE, THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME FUNDAMENTAL MISUNDERSTANDING. HOW DID WE THINK THEIR POSITION HAD HARDENED? MR GOODALL SAID THAT THEY NOW SEEMED TO BE INSISTING ON ALL PARTICIPANTS REDUCING FROM THE OUTSET AS A PRECONDITION OF ANY PROGRESS. THIS WAS NOT THE WAY TO NEGOTIATE. WE ALSO COULD LAY DOWN PRECONDITIONS. IT WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, INDISPENSABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW TO ESTABLISH THAT THE EAST WOULD ACCEPT PHASED REDUCTIONS; AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO REDUCE PROPORTIONATELY MORE THAN THE UNITED STATES, SO AS TO REACH A COMMON CEILING ON EITHER SIDE. BUT WE DID NOT THINK IT PROFITABLE TO PRESENT THESE BADLY AS PRECONDITIONS OF PROGRESS.

4.M. JEDYNAK SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT REGARD THEIR INSISTENCE ON ALL PARTICIPANTS REDUCING FROM THE OUTSET AS A PRECONDITION OF PROGRESS. THE EASTERN SIDE DID NOT EXPECT THE WEST TO ACCEPT THEIR POSITION IN TOTO ANY MORE THAN WE PRESUMABLY EXPECTED THEM TO ACCEPT OURS. BUT WE MUST UNDERSTAND THE REAL CONCERN OF POLAND IN PARTICULAR TO SECURE REDUCTIONS IN THE BUNDESWEHR. THE POLES WERE NOT IN THE LEAST WORRIED ABOUT AMERICAN OR BRITISH FORCES. BUT THEY COULD NOT FORGET WHAT THEY HAD SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF GERMANY. (THERE THEN FOLLOWED A LONG HISTORICAL ARGUMENT WHICH IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO RECORD, WHICH ENDED WITH M. JEDYNAK LISTENING TO AN EXPOSE OF WESTERN FEARS OF THE SOVIET UNION. CONFIDENTIAL

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M. JEDYNAK SAID HE COULD SEE THE FORCE OF THIS POINT OF VIEW. HE THEN RECALLED THE STORY OF THE POLISH WORKER WHO HAD EXCITEDLY TOLD HIS FOREMAN THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD GONE TO THE MOON. THE FOREMAN ASKED WHETHER ALL THE RUSSIANS HAD GONE THERE; WHEN TOLD THAT IT WAS ONLY ONE, HE SAID CROSSLY "IN THAT CASE, WHY BOTHER TO TELL ME?")

5. WITH AN APOLOGY FOR AN IMPRESSION HE MIGHT BE GIVING THAT

HE HAD "A GERMAN FIXATION", M. JEDYNAK ASKED WHETHER HE WAS CORRECT IN JUDGING THAT THE WEST GERMAN DELEGATION WAS TAKING A HARDER LINE THAN THE REST OF THE ALLIES. MR GOODALL SAID THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION HE SHOULD PUT TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. BUT HE COULD ASSURE M. JEDYNAK THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE CASE.

6. WITH REFERENCE TO RELATIONS AMONG ALLIES, M. JEDYNAK SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT CO-ORDINATION ON THE EASTERN SIDE WAS "ROSES ALL THE WAY". IT WAS FAR FROM BEING A MATTER OF THE RUSSIANS LAYING DOWN THE LAW AND EVERYONE ELSE STANDING TO ATTENTION AND SAYING "SIR". FOR THE RUSSIANS, MBFR WAS JUST ONE ELEMENT IN THEIR GLOBAL POLITICAL STRATEGY, ALBEIT A VERY IMPORTANT ONE. FOR THE POLES AND THE OTHER EAST EUROPEANS, HOWEVER, IT LOOMED VERY MUCH LARGER AS A MATTER WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECTED THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY.

7. M. WIECZOREK ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THE POLES ATTACHED TO REDUCTIONS IN THE BUNDESWEHR. THEY WERE NOT SO WORRIED ABOUT BRITISH FORCES WHOSE INITIAL REDUCTIONS COULD BE QUITE SMALL. MR FACER ACCORDINGLY ASKED HIM WHETHER THE EASTERN SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL COULD MEAN THAT TOKEN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS COULD BE COUPLED WITH MORE SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS. HE WAS RATHER VAGUE ON THIS POINT, SAYING ONLY THAT WHEN A REDUCTION OF 20,000 WAS DIVIDED AMONG ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE, THE REDUCTIONS MADE BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES COULD BE QUITE SMALL; BUT IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUESTIONING HE ADMITTED THAT THE PRIMARY MILITARY CONCERN WHICH THE SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL WAS INTENDED TO MEET WAS THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT BE FREE TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES.

8. MR GOODALL ASKED M. JEDYNAK WHAT THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR DISCUSSION WERE FOR THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. ACCEPTING

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FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE POLES ATTACHED TO REDUCTIONS IN THE BUNDESWEHR, COULD THESE CONCERNS BE MET BY SOME STRENGTHENING OF THE ASSURANCES WHICH THE WEST HAD ALREADY GIVEN ABOUT THE LINK BETWEEN PHASE I AND PHASE II? AFTER COMMENTING THAT WHAT WE HAD SO FAR SAID ABOUT THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AS TOTALLY INADEQUATE, M. JEDYNAK SAID THAT, IF FURTHER AND MORE SUBSTANTIAL ASSURANCES WERE OFFERED, THEY WOULD CERTAINLY BE OF GREAT INTEREST TO HIS DELEGATION. END TEXTHUMES

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